Property–Losing Clarity in Loss of Access Cases: the Minnesota Supreme Court\u27s Muddled Analysis in Dale Properties, LLC v. State by Boylan, Arthur G.
William Mitchell Law Review
Volume 29 | Issue 2 Article 10
2002
Property–Losing Clarity in Loss of Access Cases:
the Minnesota Supreme Court's Muddled Analysis
in Dale Properties, LLC v. State
Arthur G. Boylan
Follow this and additional works at: http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews
and Journals at Mitchell Hamline Open Access. It has been accepted for
inclusion in William Mitchell Law Review by an authorized administrator
of Mitchell Hamline Open Access. For more information, please contact
sean.felhofer@mitchellhamline.edu.
© Mitchell Hamline School of Law
Recommended Citation
Boylan, Arthur G. (2002) "Property–Losing Clarity in Loss of Access Cases: the Minnesota Supreme Court's Muddled Analysis in
Dale Properties, LLC v. State," William Mitchell Law Review: Vol. 29: Iss. 2, Article 10.
Available at: http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol29/iss2/10
FINAL BOYLAN DALE PROP..DOC 10/28/2002 11:17 PM
695
PROPERTY--LOSING CLARITY IN LOSS OF ACCESS
CASES: THE MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT’S 




A. Takings by the Federal Government..................................697
B. Minnesota Takings........................................................705
C. Loss of Access in Minnesota............................................710
III. THE DALE DECISION............................................................716
A. Facts... .........................................................................716
B. Procedural History.........................................................717
C. The Minnesota Supreme Court’s Decision .........................718
IV. ANALYSIS .............................................................................719
A. The Correct Decision ......................................................719
B. Unpacking the Public Policy............................................720
C. Shortened Analysis was Inappropriate..............................722
D. The Penn Central Transportation Alternative ..............724
V. CONCLUSION.......................................................................726
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the most intractable legal conundrums of our modern 
era concerns whether and when individuals earn the right to 
compensation as a result of governmental intrusions upon their 
property rights.  Resolving this query is no simple task for our 
courts and legislatures because every individual’s political, financial 
and ideological interests are necessarily impacted by any proposed 
or actual solution.  A recent Minnesota Supreme Court decision, 
Dale Properties, LLC v. State,1 exemplifies how these broader issues 
can arise from an ordinary, everyday occurrence.
† J.D. Candidate 2004, William Mitchell College of Law; B.A., Political 
Science & English, Saint John’s University, 2001.
1. 638 N.W.2d 763 (Minn. 2002).
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Dale Properties, LLC (“Dale”) owns an undeveloped tract of 
land in Oakdale, Minnesota.2 In 1997, a median crossover was 
closed opposite the property’s only point of access.3  As a result,
access to and from the westbound lane of Highway 5 was severely 
restricted.4  After Dale found difficulty in the development or sale 
of the property,5 it sought compensation from the state.6  The issue 
presented in Dale Properties, LLC v. State was narrow: can a
compensable taking occur when the closure of a median crossover 
limits access to property in one direction?7  Though the court’s 
decision was relatively straightforward, any decision in this area of 
law has broad implications for cases concerning loss of access, 
regulatory takings and eminent domain.
Eminent domain is the government’s power to take private 
property for public use8 and has long been recognized as an 
implicit attribute of a sovereign government.9  However, for nearly
as long, courts have attempted to articulate appropriate rules to 
limit governmental taking of private property.10  Within this
contentious context, regulatory takings law has been one of the 
most consistently debated legal subjects in recent years.11
2. Id. at 764.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 765.
6. Id. at 764.
7. Id.
8. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 541 (7th ed. 1999) (defining eminent domain as 
“the inherent power of a governmental entity to take privately owned property,
esp. land, and convert it to public use, subject to reasonable compensation for the 
taking”).
9. See infra Part II.A.
10. Id.
11. See, e.g., Gideon Kanner, Hunting the Snark, Not the Quark: Has the U.S. 
Supreme Court Been Competent in Its Efforts to Formulate Coherent Regulatory Takings 
Law?, 30 URB. LAW. 307 (1998) (chastising the U.S. Supreme Court for their 
continuing failure to clearly articulate an appropriate standard); James E. Krier, 
The Takings-Puzzle Puzzle, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1143 (1997) (attempting, 
somewhat successfully, to explain why takings jurisprudence is a “bewildering 
mess”); Richard J. Lazarus, Putting the Correct “Spin” on Lucas, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1411 
(1993) (analyzing the politically-charged atmosphere of takings law); Joseph L. 
Sax, Property Rights and the Economy of Nature: Understanding Lucas v. South Carolina 
Coastal Council, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1433 (1993) (suggesting that Lucas v. South 
Carolina Coastal Council will not have the far-reaching consequences other 
commentators have predicted); William Michael Treanor, The Armstrong Principle, 
The Narratives of Takings, and Compensation Statutes, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1151 
(1997) (proposing legislative endorsement of a judicial case-by-case determination 
in lieu of attempting to fashion legislative scheme regulatory determination).
2
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Moreover, even within takings law, loss of access cases can present 
particularly complex issues.12  In imperceptibly differing situations, 
standards for loss of access cases can vary significantly.13
This case note examines the Minnesota Supreme Court’s
decision in Dale.14  Included in this examination is a brief review of 
the takings jurisprudence in the United States and Minnesota,15
focusing on the most important recent decisions concerning loss of 
access in Minnesota.16  This note also describes the pertinent facts 
and reasoning in the Dale decision.17  In the fourth section, this 
note dissects and critiques the court’s decision.18  Finally, this note 
concludes that while reaching the proper ruling, the court failed to 
clarify the exact analytical framework necessary for loss of access 
cases in Minnesota.19
II. BACKGROUND
A. Takings by the Federal Government
Although scholars debate the extent and scope of their initial 
justifications,20 the framers of the United States Constitution clearly 
deemed it necessary to protect private property from arbitrary
governmental intrusions upon ownership.21  The manifestation of 
this sentiment is embodied in the Takings Clause22 of the Fifth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution.23
While the United States Constitution does not specifically
12. See infra Part II.C.
13. Compare infra Part II.C.1. with Part II.C.2.
14. Id.
15. See infra Part II.A.
16. See infra Part II.B-C.
17. See infra Part III.A-C.
18. See infra Part IV.A-D.
19. See infra Part V.
20. BERNARD H. SIEGAN, PROPERTY AND FREEDOM 20-29 (1997). See also
BERNARD H. SIEGAN, PROPERTY RIGHTS: FROM MAGNA CARTA TO THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT 109 (2002) (herinafter SIEGAN, PROPERTY RIGHTS).
21. GEORGE SKOURAS, TAKINGS LAW AND THE SUPREME COURT 11-13 (David A. 
Shultz ed., 1998).
22. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1467 (7th ed. 1999)(defining Takings Clause as 
“the Fifth Amendment provision that prohibits the government from taking
private property for public use without fairly compensating the owner”).
23. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution 
reads, “nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation.” Id.
3
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grant the government the power of eminent domain, it is generally 
considered inherent in sovereignty.24  As early as the Roman
period, governments used the sovereign power of eminent domain 
to regulate and acquire land for public purposes.25  Limitations
upon the government’s ability to take property (e.g., the Fifth 
Amendment’s Takings Clause) began appearing in state
constitutions in 1777.26  The Fifth Amendment, moreover, is
applicable to the state governments by virtue of the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause.
The United States Supreme Court has reluctantly expanded 
the scope of governmental actions that require compensation.27
Currently, there are two general categories of takings.28  The 
original category is physical takings.29  Physical takings occur when 
a governmental entity actually takes or physically occupies the land 
for a public use.30  The second category is labeled regulatory 
takings because they occur when governmental regulations impose 
an inordinate burden on a specific piece of property thereby 
depriving an owner of the use or enjoyment of that property.31
The standard for determining when a physical taking occurs is 
simple and consistently applied,32 but the standards for regulatory 
takings are extremely complex.  Background on regulatory takings 
jurisprudence is necessary to put the loss of access in the Dale
24. See DANIEL S. GUY, STATE HIGHWAY CONDEMNATION PROCEDURES 5 (1971);
NANCIE G. MARZULLA & ROGER J. MARZULLA, PROPERTY RIGHTS 3-4 (1997).
25. SKOURAS, supra note 21, at 11; see also GUY, supra note 24, at 4.
26. William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause 
and the Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782, 790 (1995) (providing a history of 
takings law before the Fifth Amendment).
27. SKOURAS, supra note 21, at 17-27 (developing a brief historical overview of 
takings law); SIEGAN, PROPERTY RIGHTS, supra note 20 at 75-110 (detailing major 
cases in takings law prior to 1987); Terri L. Lindfors, Note, Regulatory Takings and 
the Expansion of Burdens on Common Citizens, 24 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 255, 262 
(1998)(discussing regulatory takings law).
28. Allison J. Midden, Note, Taking of Access: Minnesota Supreme Court Declines
to Allow Admission of Evidence of Diminished Access Due to Installation of a Median in a 
Takings Case, 25 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 329, 332 (1999).
29. SKOURAS, supra note 21, at 17; DANIEL R. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW 18
(1997) (explaining physical takings cases).
30. MANDELKER, supra note 29, at 18; Lindfors, supra note 27, at 261.
31. MANDELKER, supra note 29, at 18; see also Midden, supra note 28, at 332 
n.21.
32. See, e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 
441 (1982)(affirming the traditional rule that physical occupation of property is a 
taking).
4
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Properties33 decision, a result of governmental regulation, in context.
1. Regulatory Takings on the Federal Level
a. The Mahon Decision
Regulatory takings have only fully emerged in the last
century.34  The birth of regulatory takings can be traced to the 
United States Supreme Court’s decision in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. 
Mahon.35  The facts in Mahon were relatively simple.
Originally, the Pennsylvania Coal Company (“Penn Coal”)
owned the entire disputed property.36  In 1878, when Penn Coal 
sold the surface estate, it reserved an interest in the subsurface 
mineral rights.37  To preserve that interest, Penn Coal also obtained 
a waiver against all claims due to subsidence of the surface estate.38
In 1921, the Pennsylvania legislature passed the Kohler Act.39  The 
Kohler Act was designed to prevent catastrophic surface subsidence 
by prohibiting the mining of coal beneath certain structures.40
After Penn Coal informed Mahon of its intention to mine
beneath his home, Mahon sought a protective injunction under the 
Kohler Act.41  The case eventually reached the United States 
Supreme Court on appeal.  There, Penn Coal argued that the act 
was unconstitutional because it deprived them of a subsurface 
property right.42  Agreeing, the Court issued what became the first 
regulatory takings decision, stating “[t]he general rule at least is 
that while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if
33. Dale Properties, LLC v. State, 638 N.W.2d 763 (Minn. 2002).
34. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922). See generally
Thomas A. Hippler, Reexamining 100 Years of Supreme Court Regulatory Taking 
Doctrine, 14 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 653, 653-67 (1987) (discussing the significant
developments and various standards in regulatory takings law).  For a recent 
review of Mahon and subsequent regulatory takings law, see also Robert Brauneis,
The Foundation of our “Regulatory Takings” Jurisprudence: The Myth and Meaning of 
Justice Holmes’s Opinion in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 106 YALE L.J. 613 (1996).
35. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).




40. Id. at 412-13. Specifically, the statute was intended to protect streets, 
hospitals, schools, factories and houses. See Brauneis, supra note 34, at 619.
41. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 412.
42. Id.
5
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regulation goes too far” it will be a taking.43  The Court held that
Penn Coal was unconstitutionally deprived of its subsurface mineral 
rights because the Kohler Act exceeded the authority of the state’s 
police power and, therefore, constituted a taking.44  At once 
enigmatic and simple, this 1922 holding was the first spark in what 
became the firestorm of regulatory takings jurisprudence.45
b. The Penn Central Transportation Decision
For the fifty-six years following the Mahon decision, the United 
States Supreme Court was largely silent on the regulatory takings 
issue. During this period, legal scholars and courts struggled amidst 
a great deal of confusion.46  In 1978, the Court handed down the 
next major case in the law of regulatory takings: Penn Central 
Transportation Co. v. New York.47
In 1967, New York City’s Landmarks Preservation Commission 
designated Grand Central Terminal, which was owned by Penn 
Central Transportation Company (Penn Central Co.), a historic 
landmark.48  As a result of this designation, Penn Central Co. was 
restricted in its ability to further develop the property or make any 
changes to the exterior of the building.49  Penn Central Co. claimed 
that the city’s ordinance effectuated a taking of its property interest 
in the airspace above Grand Central Terminal.50  The United States 
Supreme Court, while rejecting the owner’s claim, admitted its 
43. Id. at 414-15.
44. Id.
45. This standard has been described as “more of an observation about the 
difficulty in deciding when compensation should be paid than it is a rule capable 
of precise application.” Floyd B. Olson, The Enigma of Regulatory Takings, 20 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 433, 434 (1994).
46. Brauneis, supra note 34, at 680-86; Carol M. Rose, Mahon Reconstructed:
Why the Takings Issue is Still a Muddle, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 561, 596-97 (1984); see also
Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Commentaries on the Ethical
Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1165 (1967) (stating 
that a “bewildering” array of tests have developed for determining whether a 
taking has occurred).
47. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
48. Id. at 115-16. The commission was granted this authority under the New 
York City’s Landmarks Preservation Law. Id. at 110.
49. Id. at 111.  This type of change had to be approved in advance by a 
commission. Id. at 112.  The designation, however, also granted Penn Central Co. 
the ability to transfer unused development rights to contiguous parcels under the 
same ownership. Id. at 113-14.
50. Id. at 107.
6
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failure “to develop any ‘set formula’” for takings cases.51
Although the Court in Penn Central Transportation
acknowledged that Fifth Amendment cases were essentially “ad hoc 
factual inquiries,” the Court identified several relevant factors for 
determining whether a governmental regulation went too far and, 
thus, required compensation.52  Briefly, the Penn Central
Transportation factors consider whether: 1) there was an enormous 
adverse financial impact upon the owner of the property; 2) the 
landowner had a large investment-backed expectation; and 3) the 
governmental regulation was suspect or a public necessity.53
Specifically, a court ought to consider the “economic impact of the 
regulation on the claimant and, particularly, the extent to which 
the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed
expectations.”54 The Penn Central Transportation decision, however,
was not the last word from the Court. In the twenty-five years since 
Penn Central Transportation, the United States Supreme Court has 
decided several other high-profile regulatory cases.55  In doing so, 
the Court has enunciated several other tests.56  However, except in 
very specific circumstances, the application of the Penn Central 
Transportation test is usually appropriate.57 Moreover, the United 
States Supreme Court has also recently stated that categorical rules 
ought to be avoided in takings jurisprudence.58
Unfortunately, in the takings law arena, reaching agreement 
on the issues59 and articulating consistent analytical structures has 
51. Id. at 124.
52. Id.
53. Id.  This multi-factored test has been the subject of considerable
discussion. See, e.g., Page Carroccia Dringman, Comment, Regulatory Takings: The 
Search for a Definitive Standard, 55 MONT. L. REV. 245, 254-56 (1994) (examining the 
existing standards for regulatory takings law); Robert M. Washburn, Reasonable
Investment-Backed Expectations as a Factor in Defining Property Interest, 49 WASH. U. J. 
URB. & CONTEMP. L. 63, 65 (1996) (utilizing the Penn Central Transportation
standard to re-assess property rights).
54. Penn Cent. Transp., 438 U.S. at 124.
55. See, e.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994); Lucas v. South 
Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992); Nollan v. California Coastal 
Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
56. See infra notes 104-07.
57. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 617-18 (2001) (examining an 
application of the categorical rule from Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council and
remanding with instructions to apply the Penn Central Transportation standard 
instead).
58. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 122 
S.Ct. 1465, 1489 (U.S. 2002) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
59. See generally Richard J. Lazarus, Counting Votes and Discounting Holdings in 
7
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been difficult. Commentators do agree, however, that takings law 
represents a continuing theoretical and legal quagmire.60
2. Loss of Access in the United States Supreme Court
Although the United States Supreme Court has never
considered a loss of access case during the twentieth century, the 
Court has addressed the issue three times in the past.61  These cases 
pre-date every major regulatory takings decision. Moreover, the 
analysis employed by the Court in these cases relies upon concepts
borrowed from the law of servitude and nuisance.62  As a result, the 
reasoning in these decisions, given the broad based development in 
regulatory takings law in the past one hundred years,63 borders on 
irrelevant for the purposes of present day takings cases.  A brief 
examination of the few United States Supreme Court decisions that 
concern loss of access shows that the factual scenario and the result 
were substantially the same in each case.
In the 1857 decision, Smith v. Corp. of Washington,64 the federal
government lowered the grade of a street.65  By doing so, the 
government effectively destroyed the access to an abutting tract of 
property.66  Twenty-one years later, in 1878, the Court decided 
Northern Transportation Co. v. Chicago,67 a case in which the City of 
Chicago had constructed a tunnel and made improvements to the 
street.68  These improvements blocked access to the landowner’s 
property.69  Only nineteen years after Northern Transportation Co., in 
1897, the Court decided Gibson v. United States.70  The claim in 
Gibson arose as a result of the federal government’s construction of 
a dike on the Ohio River which eliminated access to a pier.71
In deciding these cases, the United States Supreme Court 
utilized other property-related theories as the rationale to support 
the Supreme Court’s Takings Cases, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1099 (1997).
60. See, e.g., Midden, supra note 28, at 329 n.1.
61. Id. at 336.
62. Takings law was dominated by other property theories for years. See, e.g.,
Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915); Hippler, supra note 34, at 655.
63. See supra II.A.1.
64. 61 U.S. 135 (1857).
65. Id. at 136.
66. Id.
67. 99 U.S. 635 (1878).
68. Id. at 636.
69. Id.
70. 166 U.S. 269 (1897).
71. Id. at 270.
8
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their ultimate result.  In Smith, the Court noted that the plaintiff’s 
action was founded upon the theory that the plaintiff has “a right 
to keep a nuisance” at the expense of the collective good.72
Likewise, in Northern Transportation Co., the Court loosely framed its 
analysis on nuisance principles.73  Finally, in Gibson, after the Court 
conducted a truncated Fifth Amendment analysis, it concluded that 
no taking took place because the improvement was for the public 
good and the governmental action was merely an “exercise of a 
servitude to which her property had always been subject.”74
It is certainly noteworthy that the United States Supreme 
Court has never found a Fifth Amendment taking in a loss of access 
case.75  Perhaps even more significant, the Court has also never 
entirely foreclosed the possibility that deprivation of access may 
constitute a compensable taking.
3. Police Power on the Federal Level
The act of using land gives rise to an implied obligation; 
neither a property owner nor a mere user may use the land in a way 
that is injurious to others.  The government enforces this
obligation through its police power.  Police power has eluded static 
definition,76 but courts have used the term in numerous situations 
to justify the regulation or taking of property without providing 
compensation.77
The modern police power has ancient conceptual origins.78  As 
the close legal and theoretical counterpart of eminent domain,79 it 
72. Smith v. Corp. of Washington, 61 U.S. 135, 146 (1857).
73. Northern Transp. Co., 99 U.S. at 640.
74. Gibson, 166 U.S. at 275.
75. Midden, supra note 28, at 336.
76. The vague definition of police power often cited is: “the inherent and 
pleanry power of a sovereign to make all laws necessary and proper to preserve the 
public security, health, morality and justice.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1178 (7th
ed. 1999).
77. See, e.g., Dale Properties, LLC v. State, 638 N.W.2d 763 (2002).
78. Justice Philip A. Talmadge, The Myth of Property Absolutism and Modern 
Government: The Interaction of Police Power and Property Rights, 75 WASH. L. REV. 857,
861-62 (2000).  Justice Talmadge traced the historical roots of police power to the 
ancient Greeks: “the ancient Greeks recognized early on the importance of police 
power in their political philosophy.” Id. at 861.
79. For a remarkably succinct discussion of the relationship between eminent 
domain and the police power of the state, see Dan Herber, Comment, Surviving
the View Through the Lochner Looking Glass: Tahoe-Sierra and the Case for Upholding
Development Moratoria, 86 MINN. L. REV. 913, 918-19 (2002). The difference
between the two types of governmental power is simple.  “Police powers and
9
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is also considered an “inherent attribute of sovereignty at all levels 
of government.”80  Police power provides the government with “the 
power to so regulate the relative rights and duties of all within its 
jurisdiction as to guard the public morals, the public safety, and the 
public health, as well as to promote the public convenience and the 
common good.”81
In the takings context, police power “encompass[es] the
government’s ability to regulate land use and personal property 
without incurring the obligation of paying compensation.”82
Although the state’s police power cannot be minimized by
requiring compensation whenever the state asserts it, the police 
power remains subject to the limitations of the federal and state 
constitutions.83
Although different theories exist to justify the exercise of the 
police power,84 the search for a justification is largely an exercise in 
semantics.  The efforts “to give definition to what may be an 
indefinable threshold between the police power and eminent 
domain have yielded only profound confusion for practitioners.”85
Indeed, many decisions are based upon “an unarticulated sense of 
fairness or justice that is shrouded in a cloud of paraphrased quotes 
from unreconciled state and federal decisions.”86  Difficult
decisions are sprung from the unclear division between legitimate 
eminent domain differ in that ‘[e]minent domain takes property because it is 
useful to the public,’ whereas the ‘police power regulates the use of property or 
impairs the rights in property because the free exercise of these rights is
detrimental to public interest.’” Id. at 918 (quoting 3 PATRICK J. ROHAN, ZONING
AND LAND USE CONTROLS § 16.02[3], at 16-58 n.42 (internal citations omitted)); see
also Ray v. State Highway Comm’n 410 P.2d 278, 280-82 (Kan. 1966).
80. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF
EMINENT DOMAIN 108 (1985).
81. House v. Mayes, 219 U.S. 270, 282 (1911).
82. Brian D. Lee, Note, Regulatory Takings Depriving All Economically Viable Use 
of a Property Owner’s Land Require Just Compensation Unless the Government Can Identify
Common Law Nuisance or Property Principles Furthered by the Regulation, 23 SETON HALL
L. REV. 1840, 1844 n.26 (1993) (citing JOHN E. NOWACK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 11.10, at 423 (4th ed. 1991)). See also Herber, supra note 
79, at 918 (citing Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 
U.S. 226, 252-54 (1897)).
83. Marshall v. Kansas City, Mo., 355 S.W.2d 877, 883-84 (Mo. 1962).
84. For early theories on police power, see T.D. Havran, Eminent Domain and 
the Police Power, 5 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 380 (1930); R.S. Wiggin, The Power of the 
State to Restrict the Use of Real Property, 1 MINN. L. REV. 135 (1917); Lee, supra note
82, at 1845 n.26.
85. Olson, supra note 45, at 450.
86. Id.
10
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exercises of the police power and state actions which require 
compensation.
B. Minnesota Takings
The Minnesota Constitution, like the United States
Constitution, also contains a takings provision87 which requires 
payment of just compensation when land is taken for public use.
The Takings Clause of the United States Constitution’s Fifth
Amendment and the takings provision of the Minnesota
Constitution share several common characteristics.  Both ensure 
that the government cannot force “some people alone to bear 
public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne 
by the public as a whole.”88 Minnesota’s provision, like the federal 
equivalent, utilizes several different tests to determine when a 
property owner is entitled to compensation.89  Like those of many 
other jurisdictions, the Minnesota takings provision90 is considered 
broader in application than the federal equivalent91 because it 
contains the language “taken, destroyed or damaged.”92  Moreover, 
the statutory definition of a “taking” in Minnesota includes “every 
interference . . . with possession, enjoyment or value of private 
87. MINN. CONST. art. I, § 13. This provision “imposes a condition on the 
exercise of the state’s inherent supremacy over private property rights.”  Johnson 
v. City of Plymouth, 263 N.W.2d 603, 605 (Minn. 1978).
88. Zeman v. City of Minneapolis, 552 N.W.2d 548, 552 (Minn. 1996)
(quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)).
89. See, e.g., Lindfors, supra note 27, at 267-78. See also Olson, supra note 45, at 
437-49.
90. Twenty-four other state constitutions also extend compensation to
situations where property is “taken or damaged” rather than only “taken.”
Midden, supra note 28, at 337 n.58. See, e.g., ALASKA CONST. art. 1, § 18 (“Private 
property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just
compensation”); CAL. CONST. art. I, § 19 (“Private property may be taken or
damaged for public use only when just compensation . . . has first been paid to . . .
the owner”); ILL. CONST. art. I, § 15 (“Private property shall not be taken or 
damaged for public use without just compensation”); TEX. CONST. art. I, § 17 (“No 
person’s property shall be taken, damaged or destroyed for or applied to public 
use without adequate compensation being made”). The remaining twenty-six
states adopt a similar position through judicial interpretation. See Lindfors, supra
note 27, at 259 n.24.
91. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
92. MINN. CONST. art. I, § 13. This language “was not part of the original 
Minnesota Constitution, but was added by amendment in 1896 to overrule court 
interpretations that denied consequential or indirect damages.”  Olson, supra note
45, at 436.
11
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property.”93
Minnesota gives greater protection to landowners than the 
federal government. According to the Minnesota Supreme Court, 
the takings provision of the Minnesota Constitution is to be given a 
broad interpretation so as to effectuate its purpose.94
Compensation is even appropriate when property is indirectly 
damaged as a result of state action.95  Based upon this constitutional 
and statutory directive, the “clear intent of Minnesota law is to fully
compensate its citizens for losses related to property rights
incurred” 96 as a result of state action.
1. Regulatory Takings in Minnesota
Minnesota regulatory takings law, however, like the federal 
counterpart, lacks clarity.97  This is predictable because the United 
States Constitution and the Minnesota Constitution, with the
exception of “taken, destroyed or damaged,” rely upon virtually the 
same language.98  Further, most Minnesota precedent on regulatory 
takings is couched in the propositions originally propounded by 
the United States Supreme Court.99  The Minnesota Court of 
Appeals explicitly recognized that “Minnesota courts generally 
apply the federal takings standards”100 to determine whether a land 
use regulation “deprives the property of all reasonable use.”101
Minnesota has used numerous standards to determine when 
regulation rises to the level of a compensable taking.102  Minnesota 
93. MINN. STAT. § 117.025, subd. 2.
94. See State v. Strom, 493 N.W.2d 554, 558 (Minn. 1992) (citing MINN. STAT.
§ 160.08, subd. 5 (1986)).
95. Adams v. Chicago, B. & N.R. Co., 39 Minn. 286, 290, 39 N.W. 629, 631 
(1888).
96. Strom, 493 N.W.2d at 558.
97. Christopher Dietzen, Regulatory Takings Claims: Lessons from Palazzolo v. 
Rhode Island, Bench & Bar, Minn. 27, 30 (Feb. 2002) (stating that “regulatory 
takings jurisprudence continues to be an area of law that defies any clear cut rules 
or answers.”).
98. Compare MINN. CONST. art. I, § 13 with U.S. CONST. amend. V.
99. See, e.g., Zeman v. City of Minneapolis, 552 N.W.2d 548, 552 (Minn. 1996); 
Arcadia Dev. Corp. v. City of Bloomington, 552 N.W.2d 281, 287-88 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 1996).
100. Arcadia, 552 N.W.2d at 287.
101. See Thompson v. City of Red Wing, 455 N.W.2d 512, 516 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1990); see also Parranto Bros. v. City of New Brighton, 425 N.W.2d 585, 590 (Minn. 
Ct. App. 1988).
102. See Lindfors, supra note 27 at 273 (describing, in a remarkably detailed 
and succinct fashion, the different tests and Minnesota decisions adopting each 
12
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courts have used the reasonable use test,103 the extinguished 
economic value test,104 the rough proportionality test,105 the de facto
test,106 a variable multiple factor test,107 and the public necessity 
doctrine.108  But, the Minnesota Supreme Court has never candidly 
test).
103. See McShane v. City of Faribault, 292 N.W.2d 253, 257-59 (Minn. 1980). 
Under this test, a taking occurs when a government regulation prevents
reasonable use property. Id. at 257.  However, this rule is not absolute.  When a 
regulation has a legitimate objective, no taking occurs unless all reasonable use is 
denied. Id. at n. 2. See also Czech v. City of Blaine, 312 Minn. 535, 539, 253 N.W.2d 
272, 274 (1977) (finding a taking where the government refused to rezone an area 
to accommodate a mobile home park); Pearce v. Village of Edina, 263 Minn. 553, 
572-73, 118 N.W.2d 659, 672 (1962) (holding that a zoning ordinance was
unconstitutional because it rendered some property useless or valueless).
Lindfors, supra note 27, at 273 n.147.
104. Originally enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in Lucas v. 
South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992), this test concerns whether the 
government has deprived an owner of all economically beneficial use of property.
See generally Richard A. Epstein, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council: A Tangled 
Web of Expectations, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1369 (1993). This test was adopted by the 
Minnesota Court of Appeals in 614 Co. v. Minneapolis Cmty. Dev. Agency, 547 
N.W.2d 400 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996).
105. This test was first stated by the United States Supreme Court in Dolan v. 
City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994). This test only applies when a development 
“condition” is imposed upon a landowner. See Note, California Court of Appeal Finds 
Nollan’s and Dolan’s Heightened Scrutiny Inapplicable to Inclusionary Zoning Ordinance,
115 HARV. L. REV. 2058, 2061-62 (2002).  Assuming that a taking would result, the 
court must continue and apply the “rough proportionality” test from Dolan. Id. at 
2062.  This test requires a court to examine the effect of a regulation and 
determine whether the state’s purpose adequately justifies the regulation. If such a 
“rough proportionality” exists, then the state has no obligation to compensate the 
landowner. Id. In Minnesota, under the “rough proportionality” test, three 
factors are considered to determine whether a regulation is a taking: if the 
regulation “promote(s) a public purpose; is not an unreasonable, arbitrary, or 
capricious interference with a private interest; and the means chosen bear a 
rational relation to the public purpose sought to be served.” Arcadia Dev. Corp. v. 
City of Bloomington, 552 N.W.2d 281, 288 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996)(citing Grussing 
v. Kvam Implement Co., 478 N.W.2d 200, 202 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991)).
106. The de facto test has been used when the amount of control exercised by 
the government is suspect and the regulation may have been inappropriately 
directed toward a particular parcel. See Lindfors, supra note 27, at 275; Fitger
Brewing Co. v. State, 416 N.W.2d 200 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987).
107. This test is a variation on the United States Supreme Court’s decision in 
Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980). Therein, the Court stated that, in 
order to constitute a compensable taking, a regulation must either (1) constitute 
an impermissible use of the government’s police power; or (2) deny the property 
owner of the “economically viable” use of the property. Id. at 260. This test has 
been used by the Minnesota Court of Appeals on numerous occasions. See, e.g.,
Parranto Bros., Inc. v. City of New Brighton, 425 N.W.2d 585, 590 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1988).
108. See Lindfors, supra note 27, at 276. In certain situations, a court is
13
Boylan: Property–Losing Clarity in Loss of Access Cases: the Minnesota Su
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2002
FINAL BOYLAN DALE PROP..DOC 10/28/2002 11:17 PM
708 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:2
examined the varying standards set forth by different Minnesota 
Court of Appeals decisions109 and explicitly adopted a single
approach.110  Moreover, in Minnesota, “no firmly established test 
exists for determining when a taking has occurred; instead, takings 
law turns largely on the particular facts underlying each case.”111
Thus, the Minnesota regulatory takings morass mirrors its federal
equivalent.  However, in one specific fashion, Minnesota adopts a 
different approach than the federal counterpart.
The Minnesota Supreme Court has adopted a heightened 
standard for regulations involving a governmental enterprise.  The 
governmental enterprise exception is exemplified by McShane v. 
City of Faribault.112  In McShane, the City of Faribault enacted use and 
building restrictions on the plaintiff’s property113 because it was 
situated next to the expanding city airport.  The McShane court
recognized that the regulation was “for the sole benefit of a
governmental enterprise”114 and the land-use regulation was, in 
actuality, a shortcut to avoid paying compensation through
condemnation proceedings.115  Because regulations promulgated 
for a governmental enterprise are clearly distinguishable from 
regulations aimed at benefiting the general public, the court 
ordered compensation for the landowner.116
Although Minnesota has applied the language and the general 
rules adopted at the federal level, the extent of Minnesota’s 
adoption remains unclear.  Except for an additional governmental 
enterprise rule and a more clearly articulated eagerness to provide 
empowered to invoke the public necessity doctrine. For example, if public
necessity requires destroying a single landowner’s property because its destruction 
will divert a more significant community calamity, then the government is
protected in such action. See, e.g., McDonald v. City of Red Wing, 13 Minn. 38 
(1868).
109. Many of the Minnesota standards for determining whether a
compensable taking has occurred were originally set forth by the United States 
Supreme Court. See supra Part II.
110. Many of Minnesota’s takings cases are Minnesota Court of Appeals cases 
and the Minnesota Supreme Court has not specifically addressed which standard is 
appropriate for determining when a taking occurs in Minnesota. See supra notes
102-107 and accompanying text.
111. Zeman v. City of Minneapolis, 552 N.W.2d 548, 552 (Minn. 1996).
112. 292 N.W.2d 253 (Minn. 1980); accord Thompson v. City of Red Wing, 455 
N.W.2d 512, 517 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990).
113. McShane, 292 N.W.2d at 255.
114. Id. at 258.
115. Id. at 258-59.
116. Id. However, the court endorsed allowing the city to repeal the zoning 
ordinance instead of initiating eminent domain proceedings. Id. at 260.
14
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compensation, the Minnesota regulatory taking standards definitely 
resemble those embodied in the federal regulatory takings law.
2. Police Power in Minnesota
State governments may also exercise sovereign police power to 
enact legislation or regulations to promote health, welfare or
public safety.117  The police power standard in Minnesota is as 
confused and problematic as its federal counterpart.118  In fact, the 
Minnesota Supreme Court explicitly acknowledged the confused 
state of the law on one occasion:
The dividing line between restrictions which may be
lawfully imposed under the police power and those which 
invade the rights secured to the property owner by the 
constitutional provisions that his property shall not be 
taken or damaged without compensation, nor he be
deprived of it without due process of law, has never been 
distinctly marked out, and probably cannot be.  As
different cases arise, the courts determine from the facts 
and circumstances of the particular case whether it falls 
upon one side or the other of the line.119
Police power, as a general concept, lacks clarity.
It is clear, however, that the Minnesota Supreme Court is 
willing to grant the state enormous discretion for traffic regulation.
The Minnesota Supreme Court has noted certain specific situations 
that ought to be considered non-compensable exercises of the state 
police power: “Included in this category are the establishment of 
one-way streets and lanes of traffic; median strips prohibiting or 
limiting crossovers from one lane of traffic to another; restrictions 
on U-turns, left and right turns, and parking; and regulations 
governing the weight, size, and speed of vehicles.”120  Under other 
circumstances, the court has not hesitated to find an abuse of the 
police power and award compensation to an aggrieved
landowner.121
117. See Lee, supra note 82, at 1844 n.26  (citing several major scholarly works 
concerning the scope of the state’s police power in connection with property 
owners’ rights).
118. See supra Part II.A.3.
119. State ex rel. Lachtman v. Houghton, 134 Minn. 226, 230, 158 N.W. 1017, 
1019 (1916); accord Johnson v. City of Plymouth, 263 N.W.2d 603, 606 (Minn. 
1978).
120. Hendrickson v. State, 267 Minn. 436, 441, 127 N.W.2d 165, 170 (1964).
121. See Wegner v. Milwaukee Mut. Ins. Co., 479 N.W.2d 38, 41-42 (Minn. 
15
Boylan: Property–Losing Clarity in Loss of Access Cases: the Minnesota Su
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2002
FINAL BOYLAN DALE PROP..DOC 10/28/2002 11:17 PM
710 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:2
C. Loss of Access in Minnesota
Loss of access is a subset of the broader “regulatory takings”
category because access is usually lost as a consequence of
governmental regulation.  Generally, loss of access claims arise as a 
result of road construction, median closures or the re-routing of 
traffic.  Loss of access issues arise in two distinct factual settings 
where: 1) a partial taking of property deprives the landowner of 
access and 2) no physical taking occurs but governmental action 
destroys access nonetheless.122  The Dale decision arose under the 
latter circumstance.123  Maintaining clarity between how these two 
situations differ is critically important to determining the
applicable analytical framework and understanding the intricacies 
of loss of access cases.124
1. Loss of Access in Partial Takings
Partial takings occur when the government condemns only a 
portion of a landowner’s property.125  In a partial takings scenario, 
the government admits to taking property and initiates
condemnation proceedings.126  A property owner is awarded
damages at that time.  In partial takings cases, therefore, only a
single issue exists: the measure of damages.
Determining compensation in a partial takings case can be 
difficult because almost any competent evidence may be
considered if it legitimately bears upon the market value of the 
property.127  Other factors also further complicate the computation 
of damages in partial takings cases.128  The Dale decision does not 
raise any of these precise issues though.  Instead, Dale presents a 
closely related and equally difficult dilemma arising in an inverse 
1991)(providing compensation when Minneapolis police officers caused
enormous damage to an innocent third party’s home while pursuing a suspect).
122. Midden, supra note 28, at 340; Dale Properties, LLC v. State, 638 N.W.2d 
763, 768 (Minn. 2002)(Paul H. Anderson, J., concurring specially).
123. Dale Properties, 638 N.W.2d at 764.
124. Cynthia M. Filipovich, Note, Inadmissibility of Governmental Highest Possible
Use Evidence in a Partial Takings Case: A Departure from Constitutional Just
Compensation, 70 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 873, 880 (1993).
125. County of Anoka v. Blaine Bldg. Corp., 566 N.W.2d 331, 339 (Minn. 
1997) (Paul H. Anderson, J., dissenting).
126. Id.
127. MINN. CONST. art. I, § 13; MINN. STAT. § 117.025 subd. 2 (2001).
128. See, e.g., State v. Strom, 493 N.W.2d 554, 562 (Minn. 1992) (Simonett, J., 
dissenting in part and concurring in part).
16
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condemnation situation.
2. Loss of Access in Inverse Condemnation
Loss of access cases are often brought by the landowner as 
inverse condemnation proceedings.129  Unlike a partial takings case, 
an inverse condemnation case presents the primary issue of
whether there has been a taking.130  Inverse condemnation,
according to the Minnesota Supreme Court, is “a cause of action 
against a governmental defendant to recover the value of property 
which has been taken in fact by the governmental defendant, even 
though no formal exercise of the power of eminent domain has 
been attempted by the taking agency.”131
A landowner who brings an inverse condemnation claim must 
prove that the government is liable for a taking.132  Compensation is 
appropriate if the government’s use of nearby or adjacent property
has denied him of use, enjoyment, or value of his land.133  In 
Minnesota, the trial court has the responsibility to determine 
whether a property right has been taken in the constitutional 
sense.134
3. The Minnesota Law Guiding the Dale Decision
According to the Minnesota Supreme Court, its resolution of 
Dale Properties, LLC v. State was controlled entirely by three of its 
prior decisions.135  It is highly important to grasp the facts and 
reasoning of these decisions because regulatory takings decisions 
are essentially ad hoc factual inquiries.
129. See, e.g., Gibson v. Comm’r of Highways, 287 Minn 495, 498, 178 N.W.2d 
727, 729-30 (1970) (describing the typical inverse condemnation case).
Landowners who believe that they are entitled to compensation may begin
mandamus proceedings by virtue of MINN. STAT. § 117.075 (2001).
130. Filipovich, supra note 124, at 879.
131. Alevizos v. Metro. Airports Comm’n, 298 Minn. 471, 477, 216 N.W.2d 651, 
657 (1974) (quoting Thornburg v. Portland, 376 P.2d 100, 101 (Or. 1962)).
132. Filipovich, supra note 124, at 879.
133. Id. (citing JESSIE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY § 10, at 1098-99
(2d ed. 1988) (internal citation omitted)).
134. Thomsen v. State, 284 Minn. 468, 476, 170 N.W.2d 575, 581 (1969)
(remanding for a determination of constitutional property damage); see also State 
v. Prow’s Motel, Inc., 285 Minn. 1, 4, 171 N.W.2d 83, 84 (1969) (relying on 
Thomsen and remanding for a determination).
135. Dale Properties, LLC v. State, 638 N.W.2d 763, 765-66 (Minn. 2002).
17
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a. The Hendrickson Decision
An early inverse condemnation case in Minnesota concerning 
loss of access was Hendrickson v. State.136  The loss of access occurred 
in Hendrickson when the state rebuilt and widened a portion of 
Highway 63 near Hendrickson’s motel in Rochester, Minnesota.137
In 1956, when Hendrickson purchased the disputed property, two 
driveways provided the motel unlimited access to Highway 63.138
Sometime thereafter, the state designated the thoroughfare a 
controlled access highway.139  In 1958, reconstruction began.140  The 
highway was rebuilt with a median, service roads, and controlled 
points of entry.141  The state did not condemn any of the
Hendrickson’s motel property,142 and the plaintiffs retained access 
via the same driveways, but the driveways were shortened from 85 
feet to 40 feet.143  Significantly, however, Hendrickson no longer 
had direct unlimited access to either direction of traffic.144  Instead, 
the property’s remaining access necessitated travel in a circuitous 
route via the newly installed service road.145
The Hendrickson case presented a specific issue: whether the 
property “suffered compensable damage by being denied access to 
the main thoroughfare except at interchanges yet to be designated, 
if the property has unlimited access to a service road over which the 
main thoroughfare may be reached by a circuitous route.”146  The 
issue, in other words, was whether a landowner is entitled to 
compensation for having his once unlimited access reduced to 
circuitous access.
According to the Hendrickson court, Minnesota and the weight 
of other authority in 1964 adhered to the broad proposition that 
“access to a public highway from abutting property . . . may not be 
denied without compensation.”147  Controlling or limiting access,
136. 267 Minn. 436, 440, 127 N.W.2d 165, 169 (1964).
137. Id. at 437, 127 N.W.2d at 167.
138. Id. at 437, 127 N.W.2d at 167-68.
139. Id. at 437, 127 N.W.2d at 168.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 437, 127 N.W.2d at 167.
142. Id. at 438-39, 127 N.W.2d at 168-69.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 440-41, 127 N.W.2d at 169-70.
146. Id. at 440, 127 N.W.2d at 169.
147. Id. at 440-41, 127 N.W.2d at 169-70 (citing Burnquist v. Cook, 220 Minn. 
48, 57, 19 N.W.2d 394, 399 (1945); Gustafson v. Hamm, 56 Minn. 334, 339, 57 
N.W. 1054, 1055 (1894); Underwood v. Town Bd. of Empire, 217 Minn. 385, 388, 
18
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however, was generally considered a non-compensable exercise of 
the state’s police power.148  The court acknowledged that in certain 
situations traffic regulations which unduly burden a specific
property owner “may cause compensable injury.”149 A compensable
injury to the property, the court continued, could occur if the 
limitation in access is “different in kind and not merely in degree 
from that experienced by the general public.”150
The Hendrickson court also stated that Minnesota property 
owners have a right to “reasonably convenient and suitable
access”151 to an abutting highway in at least one direction.152
Furthermore, what constitutes reasonably convenient and suitable 
access was a fact question for a jury to determine.153
b. The Gannons Case
Only two short years later, in 1966, the Minnesota Supreme 
Court decided State by Mondale v. Gannons, Inc.,154 another inverse 
condemnation case concerning loss of access.155  The loss of access 
in Gannons also arose from road construction.156  The roadway 
adjacent to Gannons’ property was rebuilt to provide for the 
installation of a median and one-way traffic in both directions.157  As 
in Hendrickson, the median limited Gannons’ once unlimited access 
to a circuitous route.158  The plaintiff petitioned for condemnation 
proceedings, alleging that the highest and best use of the property 
had changed from restaurant to industrial.159  Evidence in the 
14 N.W.2d 459, 461 (1944); State by Burnquist, v. Miller Home Dev., Inc., 243 
Minn. 1, 9, 65 N.W.2d 900, 905 (1954). See W. E. Shipley, Annotation, Abutting
Owner’s Right to Damages or Other Relief for Loss of Access Because of Limited-Access
Highway or Street, 43 A.L.R.2d 1072 (1955) and C. C. Marvel, Annotation, Power to 
Restrict or Interfere with Access of Abutter by Traffic Regulations, 73 A.L.R.2d 689, 691 
(1960)).
148. Hendrickson, 267 Minn. at 440, 127 N.W.2d at 169.
149. Id. at 442, 127 N.W.2d at 170.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 446, 127 N.W.2d at 173. Accord Johnson v. Plymouth, 263 N.W.2d 
603, 605 (Minn. 1978); Anoka v. Esmailzadeh, 498 N.W.2d 58, 60 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1993).
152. Hendrickson, 267 Minn. at 436, 127 N.W.2d at 165.
153. Id. at 445-46, 127 N.W.2d at 172-73.
154. 275 Minn. 14, 145 N.W.2d 321 (1966).
155. Id. at 14, 145 N.W.2d at 321.
156. Id. at 16, 145 N.W.2d at 324.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 17, 145 N.W.2d at 325.
159. Id.
19
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record showed, however, that after the road construction, the 
plaintiff re-modeled his restaurant and his business actually
increased.160  A hearing was held and the court determined that the 
property had suffered no damage.161
On appeal, the Minnesota Supreme Court cited several
sections of the Hendrickson decision162 and reiterated their assertion 
that addition of a median or dividers in a roadway cannot compel 
compensation.163  The court stated that although a complete or 
unreasonable blocking of an abutter’s access would constitute a 
taking, the regulation (taking) of access in only one direction was 
not necessarily compensable.164
In order to be consistent with Hendrickson, if the remaining 
access was not reasonably convenient and suitable, then
compensation would be required. In its opinion, however, the 
Gannons court did not reach the question of whether the
remaining access was reasonably convenient and suitable.165
Rather, the court ordered a new trial because the jury may have 
been confused by ambiguous instructions.166
The Gannons decision, therefore, was relatively hollow. The 
Minnesota Supreme Court did not extend or modify the existing 
law in Gannons.  It also failed to articulate a standard for
determining reasonably convenient and suitable access. In fact, the 
decision may have been a step backward.  If one overlooks why the 
case was remanded,167 it may appear that the court eliminated the 
“reasonably convenient and suitable access” requirement of their 
loss of access compensation test from Hendrickson.168
c. The Blaine Building Case
The Minnesota Supreme Court did not address another loss of 
160. State by Mondale v. Gannons, Inc., 275 Minn. 14, 17, 145 N.W.2d 321, 325 
(1966).
161. Id.
162. Id. at 20, 145 N.W.2d at 326 (quoting Hendrickson v. State, 267 Minn. 436, 
440, 127 N.W.2d 169, 171).
163. Id.
164. Id. at 24, 145 N.W.2d at 329.
165. Id. at 24-25, 145 N.W.2d at 329.
166. Id. at 25, 145 N.W.2d at 329.
167. Id.
168. In fact, Justice Paul H. Anderson discusses the potential for misreading 
this ambiguity in his concurring opinion to the Dale Properties decision. Dale 
Properties, LLC v. State, 638 N.W.2d 763, 769 (Minn. 2002) (Paul H. Anderson, J., 
concurring specially).
20
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access case until some thirty years later in Anoka v. Blaine Building
Corp.169  In Blaine Building, an abutting landowner once again lost 
access as a result of road construction.170 Anoka County widened a 
portion of University Avenue and installed a median which
prevented access in one direction to and from the plaintiff’s
properties.171  Significantly, unlike Hendrickson and Gannons, the 
plaintiff’s property was also subject to a partial taking in connection 
with the highway reconstruction project.172
As in Hendrickson, the Minnesota Supreme Court stated that 
loss of access in one direction is non-compensable where
reasonably convenient and suitable access is retained in the other 
direction.173  The court concluded that loss of access “may not be 
the basis of severance damages where a property owner is subject to 
a partial taking and coincidentally loses access due to the
construction of a median barrier.”174  The dissenting opinion
observed the court’s decision mistakenly relied upon inverse
condemnation precedent175 in what was clearly a partial takings 
context.176
The real issue in Blaine Building was whether the loss of access 
ought to be considered in the partial takings damage
computation.177  After Blaine Building, therefore, a possibility
remained that if a median closure eliminated access in one
direction and the remaining access was not reasonably convenient 
and suitable, compensation would be appropriate.
In Minnesota, and elsewhere, loss of access cases require
intricate analysis.  However, the milieu is traversable. Gannons is a 
relatively hollow decision because it relies entirely on Hendrickson
and does not extend the law any further.  Moreover, the holding in 
169. 566 N.W.2d 331 (Minn. 1997).
170. Id. at 333.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. Compare Johnson Bros. Grocery, Inc. v. State, 304 Minn. 75, 229 
N.W.2d 504 (1975).  In Johnson Bros., a highway construction project eliminated
the plaintiff’s immediate access to the highway. Id. The Minnesota Supreme Court, 
relying upon Hendrickson, found a taking and ordered compensation. Id. at 505. 
But see Courteaus, Inc. v. State, 268 N.W.2d 65 (Minn. 1978) (a similar fact 
situation with a contrary result based upon the same precedent).
174. Anoka v. Blaine Bldg. Corp., 566 N.W.2d 331, 336 (Minn. 1997).
175. Hendrickson, 267 Minn. at 441, 127 N.W.2d at 170; Gannons, Inc., 275 
Minn. at 14, 145 N.W.2d at 321.
176. Blaine Bldg. Corp., 566 N.W.2d at 339 (Paul H. Anderson, J., dissenting).
177. Midden, supra note 28, at 349.
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Blaine Building, because it was a partial taking case, should have had 
little effect on Dale’s resolution.  In sum, the foregoing cases 
suggest that, regardless of context, the Minnesota Supreme Court is 
not eager to grant compensation for loss of access when the
property retains access in at least one direction.
III. THE DALE DECISION
A. Facts
Dale Properties, LLC (Dale), owns approximately 29 acres of 
undeveloped land in Oakdale, Minnesota.178  In 1965, the state 
condemned179 a portion of the Dale Property to build an
interchange at the intersection of Interstate 694 and Highway 5.180
As a result, access to and from Dale’s property was reduced to a 
single point which provided access to both directions of traffic on 
Highway 5.181  Sometime between 1973 and 1997, a median was 
installed on Highway 5.182  A median crossover point opposite 
Dale’s property was maintained and, therefore, Dale retained full 
and unrestricted access to and from Highway 5.183
In 1997, the median crossover opposite Dale’s property on 
Highway 5 was closed by the Minnesota Department of
Transportation.184  The closure eliminated direct access to the 
westbound lane of Highway 5.185  Today, the property remains 
under the same zoning designations despite the restricted access.186
178. Dale Properties, LLC v. State, 638 N.W.2d 763, 764 (Minn. 2002).
179. This condemnation proceeding was entitled State v. Morphew-James
Investments Co. et. al. Respondent’s brief at 4, Dale Properties, LLC v. State, 638 
N.W.2d 763 (Minn. 2002) (No. 00-837).
180. Dale Properties, LLC v. State, 619 N.W.2d 567, 569 (Minn. Ct. App. 
2000), rev’d, 638 N.W.2d 763 (Minn. 2002). At one point, the Dale property had 
unlimited access to Interstate 694 and Highway 5. As a result of the 1965
condemnation proceeding, the state limited Dale’s access to a thirty-foot portion 
of Highway 5 memorialized in a 1973 Final Certificate issued at the conclusion of 
the condemnation proceedings. Id. at 570.
181. Dale Properties, 638 N.W.2d at 764.  Bordering the property to the west is 
Interstate 694. Id.  To the east of the property is another parcel of land owned by a 
third party who is uninvolved in this litigation. Id. On the south side, there is a 
railroad right of way. Id. On the north side, where the property is bordered by 
Highway 5, a thirty foot access point exists on the west edge of the property. Id.




186. The property, at the time of the supreme court hearing, was zoned 
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On at least two occasions, Dale has attempted to sell or
develop the property.  In 1997, before the crossover was closed, 
Dale had entered into a purchase agreement with Ryan Companies, 
Inc. (Ryan).187  However, after the crossover was closed, Ryan 
canceled the sale.  Likewise, a purchase agreement signed in 1998 
with Security Capital Pacific Trust (“Security”), was canceled by 
Security.  Security and Ryan both cited complications arising
directly from the restricted access to the property as the primary 
impetus behind the cancellation of their respective purchase
agreements.188
As a result, in March of 1999, Dale petitioned the court for a 
writ of mandamus seeking the initiation of an inverse
condemnation proceeding.189  Specifically, Dale alleged difficulty in 
developing or selling the property and a diminution in value of 
approximately $800,000.190
B. Procedural History
Before the trial court, the State of Minnesota moved for 
summary judgment on grounds that the existence of access in at 
least one direction precluded the cause of action.191  Apparently 
agreeing, the trial court granted summary judgment.192  On appeal, 
the Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed and remanded,193 noting 
that the trial court had failed to consider whether the retained 
access was “reasonably convenient and suitable.”194  The State 
subsequently petitioned the Minnesota Supreme Court to review 
Industrial Office (northerly portion), General Industrial (southerly portion) and 
guided Commercial. Respondent’s Brief at 3, Dale Properties, LLC v. State, 638 
N.W.2d 763 (Minn. 2002) (No. 00-837) (citing Affidavit of Scott Rupert, Thomas 
Loucks).
187. Respondent’s Brief at 5-6, Dale Properties, LLC v. State, 638 N.W.2d 763 
(Minn. 2002) (No. 00-837) (citing Affidavit of Alan Dale).
188. Respondent’s Brief at 5-6, Dale Properties, LLC v. State, 638 N.W.2d 763 
(Minn. 2002) (No. 00-837) (citing Affidavit of Alan Dale, John Lang, Joseph 
Fogarty).
189. Dale Properties, 638 N.W.2d at 765.
190. Id. Dale alleged that “before the (median) closing, the highest and best 
use of the property was threefold: a convenience store with gas pumps, a hotel 
with a restaurant, and office buildings and warehouse space. Dale claimed that, 




194. Dale Properties, LLC v. State, 619 N.W.2d 567, 571 (Minn. Ct. App. 
2000), rev’d, 638 N.W.2d 763 (Minn. 2002).
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the case and certiorari was granted.195  On its face, this appears 
surprising as the appellate court’s remand was entirely reasonable, 
sound and in accord with Minnesota precedent. Presumably, the 
Minnesota Supreme Court granted review of the case because they 
saw an opportunity in the Dale case to clarify Minnesota regulatory 
takings jurisprudence.
C. The Minnesota Supreme Court’s Decision
The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed the appellate court. It 
concluded that “a property owner who retains access to traffic in 
one direction, although losing it in the other direction due to the 
closure of a median crossover, retains reasonable access as a matter 
of law.”196  In reaching this conclusion, the Minnesota Supreme 
Court relied heavily on the reasoning expressed in Hendrickson,
Gannons and Blaine Building.197
The important policy considerations were explicitly
highlighted in the court’s opinion.198  Most of the policy
justifications and case citations were transplanted directly from 
Hendrickson, Gannons and Blaine Building.199
First, the court noted the state’s placement of highway
medians as an exercise of police power.200  Highway medians are 
considered a part of the state’s duty to create safe roadways.201
Generally, the court stated, the maintenance of safe roadways is 
considered a legitimate exercise of the police power.202  Second, the 
court noted that medians result in general travel restrictions.203
Usually, travel restrictions such as medians are not unique to any 
property owner, and thus, cannot constitute a “taking.”204  Third, 
the closure of the median crossover did not constitute a substantial 
impairment of the Dale property’s right of access because only 
195. Dale Properties, 638 N.W.2d at 764.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 765-66.
198. Id. at 766-67.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 766; see also Hendrickson v. State, 267 Minn. 436, 442, 127 N.W.2d 
165, 170 (Minn. 1964).
201. Dale Properties, 638 N.W.2d at 766.
202. Id.
203. Id.  Specifically, the court stated that “restrictions on travel that result 
from the use of highway medians affect all members of the traveling public and 
are not unique to abutting property owners.” Id.
204. Id. at 766; see also Hendrickson v. State, 267 Minn. 436, 441, 127 N.W.2d 
169, 170 (Minn. 1964).
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circuitry of route resulted.205  Fourth, and finally, the court
expressed a reluctance to create “a legal environment in which the 
cost of regulating traffic is prohibitive.”206
The court determined that “closure of the median crossover
opposite Dale’s access point was a noncompensable exercise of the 
state’s police power.”207  The Dale decision has a more serious 
consequential reach though. It has essentially foreclosed the
possibility in Minnesota that compensation could ever be
appropriate when a median is closed and access in one direction is 
lost.208
IV. ANALYSIS
The Dale decision afforded the Minnesota Supreme Court an 
occasion to revisit and clarify the Minnesota loss of access cases.209
Unfortunately, the court did not carefully utilize its longstanding 
precedent to clearly articulate the necessary analysis a trial court 
should use in a loss of access case.210  Furthermore, the Minnesota 
Supreme Court ran afoul of the historically broad Minnesota
definition of property rights and governmental actions subject to 
the takings limitation.211  Finally, the court failed to fully consider 
the various analytical frameworks presented on the federal level 
and adopt a clear standard for regulatory takings in Minnesota.
The result in Dale is an overly broad rule. Dale’s holding
unnecessarily curtails the limitations on the power of eminent 
domain and perpetuates the existing uncertainty in Minnesota 
regulatory takings jurisprudence.
A. The Correct Decision
The Minnesota Supreme Court relied upon Hendrickson,
Gannons and Blaine Building to resolve Dale.212  Although these cases 
205. Dale Properties, 638 N.W.2d at 767; see also People v. Sayig, 101 Cal.App.2d 
890, 226 P.2d 702, 711 (1951).
206. Dale Properties, 638 N.W.2d at 767.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 764.  “[A] property owner who retains access to traffic in one 
direction, although losing it in the other direction due to the closure of a median 
crossover, retains reasonable access as a matter of law.” Id.
209. Id. 763.
210. Id.
211. See supra Part II.B.
212. Dale Properties, 638 N.W.2d at 765-66.
25
Boylan: Property–Losing Clarity in Loss of Access Cases: the Minnesota Su
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2002
FINAL BOYLAN DALE PROP..DOC 10/28/2002 11:17 PM
720 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:2
arose in analytically different scenarios,213 the Minnesota Supreme 
Court acknowledged a merger of these analyses and concluded it 
had no effect on the ultimate finding in Dale.214 As Justice Paul 
Anderson astutely observed in his concurrence, “the irony of citing 
Blaine Building. to support the result reached in the case before us 
today is that the inverse condemnation cases inappropriately relied 
upon in Blaine Building. are appropriate” for Dale’s inverse
condemnation claim.215 Regardless, in light of the current law on 
loss of access in Minnesota, the court made the correct decision.
Like in Hendrickson or Gannons, the Dale property retains 
reasonably convenient and suitable access to the main
thoroughfare in at least one direction.216  In Dale’s specific
circumstances, closure of the median crossover requires those 
wishing to enter the property from the east to travel only an 
additional five-eighths of a mile.217  Likewise, those wishing to exit
the property and travel west are required to travel only one 
additional mile.218 Minor inconvenience alone should not be a 
determinative factor in any takings analysis.219 Therefore,
according to the standard enunciated in Hendrickson and reiterated 
in Gannons, no taking occurred in this instance.220  Arriving at the 
correct conclusion, however, does not necessarily indicate that the 
court employed an appropriate analytical process to reach its
decision.
B. Unpacking the Public Policy
The primary question presented by the Dale case was whether 
the closure of a median crossover was within the state’s police 
power. Dale falls squarely on the division between legitimate 
exercises of police power and state actions subject to the takings 
limitation. Thus, the court relied upon public policy to drive its 
213. Anoka v. Blaine Bldg. Corp., 566 N.W.2d 331, 339 (Minn. 1997) (Paul H. 
Anderson, J., dissenting).
214. Dale Properties, 638 N.W.2d at 765.
215. Id. at 768 (Paul H. Anderson, J., concurring specially).
216. Id. at 764-65.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. At least one other jurisdiction has considered the level of inconvenience 
as a factor in takings determination. See infra note 232.
220. Dale Properties, 638 N.W.2d at 768 (Paul H. Anderson, J., concurring 
specially).
26
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 2 [2002], Art. 10
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol29/iss2/10
FINAL BOYLAN DALE PROP..DOC 10/28/2002 11:17 PM
2002] LOSING CLARITY IN LOSS OF ACCESS CASES 721
ultimate result.221  At first glance, the court’s policy justifications 
seem legitimate. However, upon closer examination, a suspicion 
arises that the court attempted to blanket its determination of the 
central issue in Dale with a plethora of precedent and only loosely 
applicable policy justifications.
The court began by recognizing the state’s duty to create and 
maintain safe roadways.222  Furthermore, the court noted that it 
may be important, as a public policy matter, to ensure that the cost 
of regulating traffic does not become prohibitive.223  However, the 
state cannot avoid compensating landowners simply by designating 
the activity a legitimate exercise of its police power.224  Instead, the 
focus ought to remain upon the injury to the property rather than 
upon the nature of the state’s activity.225
The remaining policy factors cited by the court also lack the 
necessary levels of relevancy and analytical substance.  For example, 
the court’s argument that compensation is not required when a 
state creates general travel restrictions,226 is wholly flawed.  The 
problem with the stated policy justification is simply put: this travel 
restriction affected only the Dale property.  The median closure in 
Dale was not a general travel restriction.  Median closures that 
prevent numerous roadway users from crossing over may constitute 
general travel restrictions.  The issue is significantly more
complicated when the closure of a median crossover prevents only 
one specific property owner’s access and does not truly affect other 
foreseeable roadway users.
Dale presented the exact situation envisioned by the
Hendrickson court when it noted a taking may occur if damage to a 
specific property owner is “different in kind and not merely in 
degree from that experienced by the general public.”227  The effect 
of the Dale travel restriction is clearly not shared equally amongst 
221. Id. at 766-67.
222. Id. at 766.
223. Id. at 767.
224. Respondent’s Brief at 20 n.8, Dale Properties, LLC v. State, 638 N.W.2d
763 (Minn. 2002) (No. 00-837) (citing Hendrickson v. State, 267 Minn. 436, 441-
42, 127 N.W.2d 165, 170 (1964)). See also Balog v. State Dept. of Roads, 131 
N.W.2d 402, 407 (Neb. 1964) (stating “The fact that the improvement of a 
highway is an exercise of the police power does not determine whether the 
landowner or lessee is entitled to recover damages.”).
225. Respondent’s Brief at 20, Dale Properties, LLC v. State, 638 N.W.2d 763 
(Minn. 2002) (No. 00-837).
226. Dale Properties, 638 N.W.2d at 766-67.
227. Hendrickson, 267 Minn. at 442, 127 N.W.2d at 170.
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all the traveling public.  Rather, the specific property owner is 
forced to shoulder a disproportionate burden of the regulation – a 
result both the United States and Minnesota Takings Clauses were 
expressly designed to avoid.228
Finally, the court noted “as long as property owners have 
access to the abutting highway in at least one direction, the use of 
highway medians that prohibit crossover from one traveled lane to 
another merely results in circuity of route, as opposed to
substantial impairment of the right of access.”229  In this case, 
though the Dale’s property continues to be zoned industrial and 
guided commercial, large commercial vehicles simply cannot access 
the property from the westbound lane of Highway 5 because entry 
and exit necessitate wide U-turns in a high traffic area.230
The existence of circuitous access does not necessarily
preclude a finding of substantial impairment.  The court looked to 
the circuitous access in Dale and summarily determined there was 
not a substantial impairment of access.231  This was improper.  A 
court should consider the circuitous nature of the remaining access 
as a factor (but not a determinative factor) in whether there is a 
substantial impairment of access.232
Legitimate policy justifications were crucial in Dale because the 
governmental regulation created an enormous burden for a
specific landowner.233  The policy cited by the Minnesota Supreme 
Court in Dale simply fails to meet this challenge.
C. Shortened Analysis was Inappropriate
The shortened analysis in Dale was inappropriate and, as a 
result, the ruling was inexcusably expansive.  The Dale court
concluded that a property owner who retains access to traffic in 
228. See supra Part II.B.
229. Dale Properties, 638 N.W.2d at 767.
230. Respondent’s Brief at 36, Dale Properties, LLC v. State, 638 N.W.2d 763 
(Minn. 2002) (No. 00-837).
231. Dale Properties, 638 N.W.2d at 765.
232. The North Dakota Supreme Court has adopted this view in Boehm v. 
Backes, 493 N.W.2d 671, 674 (N.D. 1992).  In Boehm, the court stated that 
although diversion of public traffic does not create a right to compensation, “loss 
of traffic, loss of business, and circuitry of travel are factors to be fairly weighed in 
determining the reasonableness of access remaining to and from an adjacent 
highway after the direct physical disturbance by closure of the street intersection.” 
Id. See also Palm Beach County v. Tessler, 538 So.2d 846, 849-50 (Fla. 1989).
233. Respondent’s Brief at 5-6, Dale Properties, LLC v. State, 638 N.W.2d 763 
(Minn. 2002) (No. 00-837).
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one direction when a median crossover is closed, “retains
reasonable access as a matter of law.”234  In support of this ruling, 
the court noted that median closure was a specific example of non-
compensable governmental regulation in Hendrickson.235
The rule announced in Dale is inappropriate for several
reasons.  First, although the court notes this decision assumes an 
extreme situation will not arise,236 it is certainly within the realm of 
possibilities that a closure of a median crossover could cause a 
“substantial interference with the possession, enjoyment or value”237
of a property and, thus, constitute a taking. In other words, a fact 
situation in which the closure of a median crossover necessitates an 
additional one or two mile roundabout is not inconceivable.238  One 
must ask: how far would the average Minnesotan be willing to 
extend their personal daily commute before declaring their
circuitous access something more than a mere inconvenience?239
This ruling also disregards the Minnesota landowner’s right to 
“reasonably convenient and suitable” access.240  The slow, yet
nonchalant, degradation of this property right contradicts the 
traditional broad protection afforded landowners in Minnesota.241
As noted above, the Minnesota Constitution and statutes evince a 
clear policy toward providing compensation when state action 
234. Dale Properties, 638 N.W.2d at 764.
235. Id. at 766 (quoting Hendrickson v. State, 267 Minn. 436, 440-41, 127 
N.W.2d 165, 169-70 (1964)).
236. Dale Properties, 638 N.W.2d at 767 n.1.
237. Id. at 765 (citing Johnson v. City of Plymouth, 263 N.W.2d 603, 605 
(Minn. 1978)).
238. Numerous cases from other jurisdictions have awarded damages when the 
restriction or limitation of access creates an undue burden on a specific
landowner. See, e.g., State v. Jacobs, 440 P.2d 32, 36 (Ariz. 1968) (stating that 
damages for loss of access cannot be “wholly contingent on the fortuity that there 
be an actual physical taking of property” and ordering compensation for loss of 
access); State v. Linnecke, 468 P.2d 8, 10-11 (Nev. 1970) (finding an additional 
one and a half miles of travel to be a substantial impairment); South Carolina 
State Highway Dept. v Allison, 143 S.E.2d 800 (S.C. 1965)(awarding damages when 
the frontage road connected with the controlled-access highway seven-tenths of a 
mile south of the owner’s property).
239. Drivers in the Minneapolis-St. Paul area already face one of the most 
congested metropolitan areas in the nation. See, e.g., “News Release June 20, 2002: 
New study shows traffic congestion in the Twin Cities costing drivers more in time 
and money” available at: http://www.dot.state.mn.us/newsrels/02/06/20tti.html (last
visited Sept. 1, 2002); “Urban Mobility Report” Texas Transportation Institute, 
(2002) (available at http://www.dot.state.mn.us/newsrels/02/06/20tti.html).
240. Dale Properties, 638 N.W.2d at 768-69 (Paul H. Anderson, J., concurring 
specially).
241. See supra Part II.B.
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harms property.242  Moreover, according to the Hendrickson
decision, what constitutes “reasonably convenient and suitable
access” is a fact question for a jury’s determination.243  Thus, 
circuitous access resulting from a closure of a median crossover 
should not be “reasonable access as a matter of law.”244  Instead, the 
court should allow a jury to determine whether the access is 
reasonably convenient and suitable.245
The shortened analysis is the most troubling aspect of the Dale
decision.  The existing analytical structure from Hendrickson and 
Gannons, which permitted the state to eliminate access in one 
direction so long as reasonably convenient and suitable access 
remained, was sound. The state already enjoyed broad discretion in 
traffic regulation under that structure.  Moreover, a possibility 
remained that a particularly onerous median closure might still 
constitute a compensable taking.
The court could have charted a more cautious course by
simply reiterating and applying the Hendrickson and Gannons
structure.246  The court would have preserved Minnesota
landowner’s right to reasonably convenient and suitable access in 
median closure cases. Instead, the court adopted a categorical rule 
which eliminated any possibility that a median crossover closure 
might be a compensable taking.247
D. The Penn Central Transportation Alternative
As noted above, Hendrickson and Gannons controlled the
resolution of Dale.  Both were decided while Mahon was the United 
States Supreme Court’s only declaration concerning regulatory 
takings.248  Since then, the United States Supreme Court has 
outlined several analytical frameworks for takings determinations.249
242. Id.
243. Hendrickson v. State, 267 Minn. 436, 445-46, 127 N.W.2d 165, 172-73
(1964).
244. Dale Properties, 638 N.W.2d at 765.
245. Moreover, when determining whether the remaining access is reasonably 
convenient and suitable, the Minnesota Supreme Court has stated that the “nature
of the property” must be considered, as well as the “circumstances peculiar to each 
case.” Johnson v. City of Plymouth, 263 N.W.2d 603, 607 (Minn. 1978).
246. The Minnesota Supreme Court could have remanded the case with
instructions to examine whether the remaining access was reasonably convenient 
and suitable.
247. Dale Properties, 638 N.W.2d at 764.
248. See supra Part II.A.1.
249. Id.
30
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 2 [2002], Art. 10
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol29/iss2/10
FINAL BOYLAN DALE PROP..DOC 10/28/2002 11:17 PM
2002] LOSING CLARITY IN LOSS OF ACCESS CASES 725
Minnesota has even occasionally recognized these alternatives.250
Little prevented the Minnesota Supreme Court from examining 
these alternatives and adopting a new framework for loss of access 
cases in Dale.
The standard enunciated in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. 
New York remains the most consistent and well-reasoned takings 
framework.251  The Penn Central Transportation standard, as
highlighted above, utilizes a combination of factors to determine 
when a taking has occurred.252  Once again, these factors include 
whether 1) there was an enormous adverse financial impact upon
the owner of the property; 2) the landowner had a large
investment-backed expectation; and 3) the governmental
regulation was suspect or a public necessity.253 The Minnesota 
Supreme Court, rather than creating a categorical rule for median 
closures, could have utilized this standard.  A brief examination of 
Dale under this analytical configuration is revealing.
First, under the Penn Central Transportation standard, it is clear 
that the median closure had a significant financial impact on the 
Dale property.  The alleged diminution in the property’s value was 
$800,000254 because the median closure resulted in an inability to 
develop or sell the land.255  Other jurisdictions have deemed 
compensation appropriate when the closure of a median causes 
such great inconvenience and related diminution in value.256  On 
the basis of this factor alone, compensation may seem appropriate.
Applying the second and third factors of Penn Central
Transportation, however, dictates a different result.  Herein, the 
250. See supra Part II.B.1.
251. 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1977); F. Patrick Hubbard, Palazzolo, Lucas, and Penn 
Central: The Need for Pragmatism, Symbolism, and Ad Hoc Balancing, 80 Neb. L. Rev. 
465, 512-14 (2001) (stating that Penn Cent. Transp. is the basic test of all takings 
and that the continuing “importance of Penn Central is its pragmatic rejection of 
per se rules in favor of a balancing process. Only such a flexible approach can 
address the complexity of takings decisions.”).
252. Penn Cent. Transp., 438 U.S. at 124.  See also supra Part II.A.1.
253. Penn Cent. Transp., 438 U.S. at 124.
254. Whether reduction in value, by itself, can constitute grounds for a
compensable taking is a very slippery question. For a remarkably lengthy
discussion of this topic see Anthony Saul Alperin, The “Takings” Clause: When Does 
Regulation “Go Too Far”, 31 SW. U. L. REV. 169 (2002).
255. Respondent’s Brief at 5-6, Dale Properties, LLC v. State, 638 N.W.2d 763 
(Minn. 2002) (No. 00-837).
256. See, e.g., Palm Beach County v. Tessler, 538 So.2d 846, 849-50 (Fla. 1989); 
State Dept. of Transp. v. Kreider, 658 So.2d 548, 550 (Fla. Ct. App. 1995); City of 
Waco v. Texland Corp., 446 S.W.2d 1, 2 (Tex. 1969).
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most salient fact is the lack of investment-backed expectations257 in 
the property.258  Moreover, as the Minnesota Supreme Court noted, 
traffic regulations generally represent legitimate exercises of the 
state’s police power.259  These factors, even in light of the significant 
diminution in value, weigh heavily against finding a compensable 
taking in Dale.  Examining Dale under the Penn Central
Transportation analytical structure would most likely provide the 
same immediate result.  But, clearly adopting Penn Central
Transportation would have more favorable long-term consequences 
than adopting the categorical rule set forth by the Minnesota 
Supreme Court.
The Minnesota Supreme Court would have done well to adopt 
the Penn Central Transportation standard in Dale.  Although the
resolution of Dale would not have been enormously impacted, 
adopting Penn Central Transportation for loss of access cases would 
have avoided the announcement of an overly broad rule.
Furthermore, its adoption also would have maintained the
possibility of compensable median closures.  Finally, and most 
importantly, its application would have signaled a serious
commitment to clarifying Minnesota regulatory takings law.
V. CONCLUSION
The Minnesota Supreme Court could have chosen at least two 
less drastic approaches to resolving the takings issue.260  First, the 
court could have remanded the case with instructions based upon 
Hendrickson and Gannons. Second, the court could have explicitly 
adopted and applied one of the analytical frameworks developed by 
United States Supreme Court.  Either option would have more 
properly served the dual goals of clarifying the confusion in this 
area and respecting the limitations embedded in the Takings 
Clause.
Regardless, the Minnesota Supreme Court made a mistake by 
257. What actually constitutes an investment-backed expectation is also the 
subject of enormous debate. See, e.g., Daniel Mandelker, Investment-Backed
Expectations in Taking Law, 27 URB. LAW. 215, 216-20 (Spring 1995); Karen
Brunner, A Missed Opportunity: Palazzolo v. Rhode Island Leaves Investment-Backed
Expectations Unclear as Ever, 25 HAMLINE L. REV. 117, 146-150 (2001).
258. The Dale property was undeveloped. Dale Properties, 638 N.W.2d at 764.
259. Id.  As noted above, however, not all traffic regulation should necessarily 
be considered non-compensable exercises of the state’s police power. See supra 
Part IV.B. and n.232.
260. See also Dietzen, supra note 97, at 27.
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adopting a broad rule in Dale because generally, in takings
jurisprudence, categorical rules should be avoided.261 After Dale,
landowners in Minnesota can be deprived of access, so long as they 
retain access in the other direction, at any time and in any place, 
without compensation.  Although the Dale court attempted to 
simplify the law, the opinion left the disorder inherent in
Minnesota takings law fully intact.
261. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 122 
S.Ct. 1465, 1489 (U.S. 2002). The United States Supreme Court states that the 
formulation of a general rule in certain takings contexts “is a suitable task for state 
legislatures.” Id.  Furthermore, the Court notes that the “temptation to adopt 
what amount to per se rules in either direction must be resisted.” Id. (citing
Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 636 (2001) (O’Connor, J., concurring)).
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